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of each of the sixty states and Canadian provinces, and changes in the
number of law schools of different types, and of their students, since 1890.
The individual schools are listed, with their tuition fees, student attendance,
and the time required to complete the course, in parallel columns, distinguish-
ing from the eighty-two full-time law schools of the United States and the
four full-time law schools of Canada, the 111 part-time or "mixed" schools
in this country that offer instruction at hours convenient for self-supporting
students, and the six Canadian schools in which the students serve a concur-
rent clerkship in a law office.
An appendix shows the number of lawyers in the several states and
Canadian provinces at successive census dates, quotes the current standards
of the American Bar Association and of the Association of American Law
Schools, and lists the publications of the Carnegie Foundation dealing with
legal education and cognate matters.
Copies of these publications, including the present "Review of Legal
Education in the United States and Canada for the Year 1934," may be had
without charge upon application by mail or in person to the office of the
Foundation, 522 Fifth Avenue, New York City.
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In Re Todd' and Constitutional Amendment
Article 16, Section 1 of the Indiana Constitution provides that after the
proposed amendment or amendments have been agreed upon by a majority
of each House of two successive General Assemblies, "then it shall be the
duty of the General Assembly to submit such amendment or amendments to
the electors of the state, and if a majority of said electors shall ratify the
same such amendment or amendments shall become a part of the Constitu-
tion." The General Assembly of 1931 enacted the following: "The Supreme
Court of the state shall have exclusive jurisdiction to admit attorneys to
practice law in all courts of the state under such rules as it may prescribe." 2
Under this statute the court prescribed regulations requiring an applicant to
take an examination to determine his professional fitness. Petitioner, Lemuel
Todd, insisted that under Article 7, Section 21 of the Constitution of Indi-
ana,3 both the statute and rules of the court are invalid. However, the
Supreme Court held that Section 21, Article 7, had been stricken from the
Constitution by amendment at the general election of 1932. At this general
election the vote on the amendment was 439,949 in favor of the adoption
and 236,613 against adoption. The majority in favor of adoption, however,
was less than half of the number of voters who voted for candidates at the
general election.
The Indiana Supreme Court in this case then removed the greatest
obstruction to the amendability of the Constitution of Indiana and overruled
three former decisions announcing a principle of law which was not legally
unsound but which made an amendment to the Constitution of Indiana a
practical impossibility. Due in main to the interpretation placed by the
Supreme Court in these three former decisions on the section of the Con-
1 (1935), 193 N. E. 865 (Ind.).
2 Acts of Indiana (1931), Ch. 64, p. 150.
3 Article 7, Section 21. "Every person of good moral character, being a voter, shall
be entitled to admission to practice law in all courts of justice."
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stitution providing for amendment, only three proposed amendments or
groups of amendments have been ratified by the electors.
Just what constitutes a "majority of said electors" within the meaning
of Section 1 of Article 16 has been the subject of much debate; and the
same is true everywhere in the construction of-like provisions, both in
statutes and constitutions.
There are three possible interpretations, each of which has been sanc-
tioned by courts in various states. First, "the majority of said electors"
might have been interpreted to mean more than half of those persons in the
state possessing the legal qualifications to vote.4 This, it would seem, is the
plainest meaning of the words, but to adopt such an interpretation would be
to place an unsurmountable barrier in the way of securing an amendment to
the Constitution. Not only would there be the problem of ascertaining the
number of legally qualified voters in the state, even in the light of present
registration laws; but if such an interpretation were given this ambiguous
clause, that great class of voters who fail to exercise their privilege at the
polls would have to be considered in determining whether or not a majority
of the electors had voted in favor of the ratification. Not voting at all would
have the effect of voting against the proposed amendment.
Nevertheless, this was the construction put on the words by the majority
of the Supreme Court in State v. Swift, 5 the first case in Indiana involving
the interpretation of this section of the Constitution. Here the question
before the court was whether or not a proposed amendment changing the
qualifications for voters had become a part of the Constitution. The returns
of the election showed that a majority of the votes cast on the proposed
amendment were in favor of ratification, but that this number fell short of
a majority of those voting at the general election at which the proposal was
submitted. Two of the members of the court, Justices Howk and Worden,
believed that it required a majority of the electors of the state to ratify a
proposed amendment, but that the number of persons voting at the general
election would be taken as the number of electors of the state. This is
clearly indulging in a legal fiction of the most flagrant sort. Mr. Justice
Biddle, writing the opinion of the majority, said that a "majority of said
electors" meant a majority of the legally qualified voters of the state, and
that the number of electors was a "fact which the courts must ascertain,
without averment or proof," and "for this purpose a court may look to the
archives of the state, to the official returns of general state elections, to
legislative action, and to the proclamations of the executive." Justice Biddle,
however, did concur with Justices Howk and Worden in that the proposal
in question had not become a part of the Constitution, since, as it did not
receive a majority of the votes cast at the general election, it did not receive
the affirmative vote of a majority of the electors of the state.6
The position taken by Justices Worden and Howk in State v. Swift 7
was approved in In re Denny,s twenty-one years later. Mr. Justice Baker,
4 School District v. Oellien (1908), 209 Mo. 464, 108 S. W. 529; State v. Willis
(1913), 47 Mont. 548, 133 Pac. 962; State v. Lancaster County Commissioners (1877).
6 Neb. 474.
r (1880), 69 Ind. 505.
6 Mr. Justice Scott and Mr. Justice Niblack wrote separate dissenting opinions which
will be discussed in connection with the third possible construction of the phrase in
question.
7 (1880), 69 Irid. 505.
8 (1901), 156 Ind. 104, 59 N. E. 359, 51 L. R. A. .722. Here there was submitted to
the electors at a general election a proposal to amend Article 7, Section 21 of the Con-
stitution. 655,965 votes were cast for the various candidates at the general election. For
the amendment 240,031 votes were cast, while 144,072 votes were cast against it.
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in the course of his discussion, said: "It is universally held that, in the
absence of a provision for registration, the number of persons who possess
the qualifications entitling them to vote at a given election is determined by
the election itself . . . so the question becomes one, not of constitutional
construction, but one of evidence. The court will take judicial knowledge of
the returns made to the Secretary of the State of the number of votes cast
at the general election and the number cast for and against the amendment
submitted at the general election." 9
In re Boswell, 10 the third Indiana Supreme Court decision interpreting
Section 1 of Article 16, followed the majority opinion in State v. Swift"
and In re Denny,12 this time, however, by a unanimous decision. The
Supreme Court still insisted that it took a majority of all the electors of the
state to ratify a proposed amendment, but resorted to the fiction that that
number was determined by the returns of the general election.' 3
The second possible construction that might be placed on the words
"majority of said electors" is that the requirement for such majority is
satisfied if more than half of the persons voting at the general election at
which the proposed amendment is submitted vote in favor of its ratification. 14
This is, in" practice, the position that the Indiana Supreme Court has taken,
in spite of the language tci the effect that it requires a majority of all the
electors of the state to ratify an amendment to the Constitution, since it has
adopted the rule that the number of electors in the state is to be determined
by the number voting at the general election.
This interpretation has the least support in logic and leads to many
impractical results. Article 16, Section 1 of the Constitution does not require
that the amendment be submitted at a general election, but leaves it a matter
to be decided by the General Assembly when and how the proposed amend-
ment shall be submitted for popular vote. As the Supreme Court in In re
Todd 15 points out, "In short we have a theoretical rule of constitutional law
which the General Assembly can suspend, for all practical purposes, by sub-
mitting single amendments at special elections." The vote at the special
election would naturally be much smaller than the vote at the general elec-
tion, and hence it is a fact that a proposed amendment can become a part of
the Constitution by virtue of an affirmative vote smaller than the negative
vote the proposal would have received at a general election. This is exactly
what happened at the general election of 1880, followed by a special election
in 1881. It is submitted that no rule of law which is so easily flaunted can
be sound political policy, particularly when so evading it is a decided financial
burden on the state.
The third construction to be placed upon "majority of said electors" is
that it means a majority of the votes cast for and against the proposition
9 Jordan, J., dissented, taking substantially the same view adopted by Justices Scott
and Niblack in State v. Swift (1880), 69 Ind. 505.
10 (1913), 179 Ind. 292, 100 N. E. 833. In this case a proposal to amend Article 7,
Section 21 was submitted at a general election, at which 627,133 votes were cast for the
various political officers. 60,357 votes were cast in favor of the proposed amendment, and
18,494 votes were cast against it. It was held that the proposal was not ratified.
'1 (1880), 69 Ind. 505.
12 (1901), 156 Ind. 104, 59 N. E. 359, 51 L. R. A. 722.
Is For a more complete discussion of State v. Swift (1880), 69 Ind. 505; In re
Denny (1901), 156 Ind. 104, 59 N. E. 359, 51 L. R. A. 722; and In re Boswell (1913),
179 Ind. 292, 100 N. E. 833, see Richman (1934), A "Majority of Electors" Means a
Majority of Those Voting on the Question, 9 Ind. L. J. 403.
14 Tecumseh National Bank v. Saunders (1912),- 51 Neb. 801, 71 N. W. 799; State
v. Brooks (1909), 17 Wyo. 344, 99 Pac. 874, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 478.
15 (1935), 193 N. E. 865 (Ind.) Fansler, C. J., dissented on the ground that the
question was well settled in Indiana.
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submitted, 16 and this is the view adopted by the court in In re Todd.17
Such an interpretation obviously disposes of all the evils which follow either
of the other constructions. This, too, has been the position taken by the
dissenting members of the court in State vs. Swift' 8 and In re Denny.' 9
The Supreme Court, however, was not without some precedent in Indiana
for the position it took in the principal case. In 1884, the question of the
interpretation of the same words was presented to the court, this time, how-
ever, in connection with a statute.20 Dailey, J., speaking for a unanimous
court, said that there -were four general principles which would apply to the
interpretation of this and like provisions: "First, where a measure is pro-
posed to the people, and its adoption made to depend on a vote of the
majority, those who do not vote are considered as acquiescing in the result
of those who do vote, even though those voting do not constitute a majority
of those entitled to vote.
"Second, where a question is required to be submitted at a certain regular
election, and is made to depend upon a majority of the votes cast at 'such
election,' a majority of all the votes cast at the election is meant, and not
merely a majority of the votes cast on that particular question.
"Third, where at a general election, a proposition is submitted to the
voters, the result of the votes on the proposition will be determined by the
votes cast for and against it, in the absence of a provision in the law, under
which it is submitted, to the contrary.
"Fourth, where a legislative body provides that a proposition shall be
submitted to the voters; that those in favor of the proposition shall cast an
affirmative vote, and that those electors opposed to the proposition shall cast
a negative vote, and that a 'majority of the votes given' shall be requisite to
the adoption of the proposed measure, then the only votes to be counted and
considered in determining whether the measure is adopted or not are those
which are given on the particular question involved."
These four propositions are approved in In re Todd,2 ' Justice Treanor,
in writing the opinion, saying: "Since there is an absence of any language
which requires a majority of all 'persons possessed of legal qualifications
entitling them to vote' or a majority of all votes cast at a general election,
we believe that the submission clause falls within the first and third propo-
sitions of Judge Dailey."
This interpretation has met with some criticism by those who contend
that such a construction permits the Constitution to be amended too easily
by too small a portion7 of the electors of the state, but on the other hand it is
often held that those who do not exercise their privilege to vote are deemed
to have consented to the result of those voting. It is further submitted that
this contention bears no weight in Indiana where the same result as that
criticized may be reached by submitting the proposition at a special election.
It seems clear that the third construction is supported by logic and practical
convenience.
II
All the problems concerned in the principal case are not settled, however,
by ascertaining whether or not the result reached was desirable from a
practical and theoretical standpoint. As is usually the case when a court
16 Green v. State Board of Canvassers (1896), 5 Ida. 130, 47 Pac. 209; Louisville
& Nashville R. Co. v. County Court (1854), 1 Sneed (Tenn.) 637, 62 Am. Dec. 424.
17 (1935), 193 N. E. 865 (Ind.).
'8 (1880), 69 Ind. 505.
19 (1901), 156 Ind. 104, 59 N. E. 359, 51 L. R. A. 722.
20 City of South Bend v. Lewis (1894), 138 Ind. 512, 37 N. E. 986.
21 (1935), 193 N. E. 865 (Ind.).
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overrules preceding cases, the state of the law is somewhat in confusion.
This is no less true in Indiana, and since the time the decision was rendered,
several suggestions have been made as to the effect of the decision.
The difficulty arises from the common-law rule that a court's decision
has not only the effect of stating what the law is and will be, but that it has
also a retroactive effect. 22 Applied retroactively, the rule of the principal
case would add four amendments 2 3 to the Constitution of Indiana which
were n ot involved in the suit of In re Todd,24 and which have heretofore
been considered as having been rejected by the voters: The amendments in
question received the vote of a majority of the electors voting on the pro-
posal, as required by the rule of In re Todd, 25 but did not receive a majority
of the votes cast at the general election at which they were submitted, as
required by the rule of the overruled cases of State vs. Swift,26 In re
Denny, 27 and In re Boswell. 28 Whether or not, then, the decision should be
given retroactive operation is a question of no little importance.
The retroactive rule, or, as it is sometimes called, the declaratory theory,
is "that the judges do not make the law but only apply it, and that judicial
decisions are not laws in and of themselves in the same sense that legislative
enactments are law, but are only evidence of the law. The evidence is always
rebuttable, and it is rebutted when the courts later change the rule. When
a pre-existing rule is changed, the new rule becomes the better evidence of
the law, not only prospectively, as to all transactions arising in the future,
but it also has been given a retrospective operation embracing jural relations
created prior to the overruling decision, but after the decision overruled.
Put more concisely, though less accurately, the result is the same as if the
older rule had never been the law."
29
Naturally such a rule, strictly and uniformly applied, would lead to many
harsh results, particularly where the parties have relied upon the prior deci-
sion in entering upon the relations which are now being questioned by the
court. Because of the retrospective effect of overruling precedent, all courts
22 Kavanaugh v. Rabior (1932), 222 Mich. 68, 192 N. W. 623; People ex rel. Rice
v. Graves (1934), 273 N. Y. S. 582; Jackson v. Harris (1930), 43 Fed. (2d) 513;
Pearson v. Orcutt (1920), 107 Kan. 305, 191 Pac. 286; Allen v. Allen (1892), 95 Cal.
184, 30 Pac. 213.
2&The general assembly of 1897 adopted a proposal to amend Sec. 1 of Article 7
to provide that the Supreme Court should consist of not less than five nor more than
eleven members. This was agreed to by the general assembly of 1899 and submitted
to the voters at the general election of 1900. The total vote for political officers cast
at the general election was 664,094. 314,710 votes were cast fdr ratification of the pro-
posal, and 178,960 votes were cast for rejection.(2) A proposal to amend Section 2 of Article 15 was submitted at the general
election of 1926, at which 1,052,994 votes were cast. 182,456 votes were for ratifica-
tion, and 177,748 votes against it.
(3) A proposal to amend Section 2 of Article 14 to provide for a classification of
townships, counties, towns and cities for purposes of registration was submitted to the
electors at the general election of 1926. 198,579 votes were cast for the proposal and
184,684 against it.
(4) A proposal to amend Article 10 by providing that the legislature could levy
an income tax was submitted to the voters at the general election of 1926. There were
239,734 votes cast in favor of the proposal, while 212,224 votes were cast against it.
Believing that the amendment had failed, the legislature resubmitted the proposal at
the general election of 1932, at which time 701,045 votes were cast for ratification and
209,076 for rejection. 1,600,484 votes were cast at the general election of 1932.
24 (1935), f93 N. E. 865 (Ind.).
25 (1935), 193 N. E. 865 (Ind.).
26 (1880), 69 Ind. 505.
27 (1901), 156 Ind. 104, 59 N. E. 359, 51 L. R. A. 722.
28 (1913), 179 Ind. 292, 100 N. E. 833.
29 Kocourek and Koven, (1935) Renovation of the Common Law Through Stare
Decisis, 29 Ill. L. Rev. 971.
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have been extremely hesitant to overrule property and contract cases, where,
it is easily seen, the application of the declaratory theory would lead to
inestimable unjust results. For the same reason there has been much agita-
tion recently to abandon the rule entirely. 30 Not only has this doctrine
received criticism by legal writers, but it has been expressly repudiated by
some courts where hardship would be worked upon the parties. Thus in
criminal cases,3 ' and in cases involving property and contract rights32 the
courts in a few states have said that the rule of the overruling case would be
accorded prospective effect only.
Although there have been no cases which involve the effect of overruling
a decision holding that a proposed amendment has not become a part of the
Constitution, there are cases which involve an analogous situation, namely,
the effect of overruling a case involving the constitutionality of a statute.
Here, as in the cases involving the common law, the general rule may be
stated that the overruled case is considered as never having been the law
unless the parties have acquired rights or liabilities on the faith of the first
decision, in which situation the overruling case is given only prospective
effect. 33
The only question remaining, then, is whether or not the holding in In re
Todd3 4 should be given retroactive effect so as to add to the Constitution of
Indiana the four amendments. It is hard to conceive of a situation in which
parties could have acquired liabilities or rights on the faith of any of the three
cases overruled, especially since none of the amendments which would become
a part of the Constitution by operation of the retroactive effect of In re
Todd35 contain self-executing provisions. As the Supreme Court in the
Todd case said, "When the overruling of a previous decision involves only
a question of public interest in no way affecting private interests, the rule of
stare decisis does not control. . . . The overruling of those cases will not
produce uncertainty in titles, or introduce doubt and confusion in questions
of property or contracts. Under such circumstances, it is the duty of the
court to correct its own errors, and the doctrine of stare decisis cannot be
successfully invoked to perpetuate them. And this is especially true when a
constitutional question is involved."
An application of the declaratory theory to In re Todd 36 would lead to
a somewhat curious result in Indiana, in that the so-called "lawyers amend-
ment" would be considered as having been a part of the Constitution since
1880. In 1900 and 1912, Section 21 of Article 7 was amended to read
exactly as it had read before the amendments of 1900 and 1912 were ratified.
In re Denny 37 and In re Boswell38 can not be considered as res adjudicata
on the question of whether the amendment became a part of the Constitution,
as res adjudicata applies only when the same parties are before the court;
30 Kocourek and Koven, (1935) Renovation of the Common Law Through Stare
Decisis, 29 Ill. L. Rev. 971; Aumann, (1932) Judicial Law Making and Stare Decisis,
21 Ky. L. J. 156.
31 State v. O'Neal (1910), 147 La. 513, 126 N. W. 454; State v. Longino (1915),
109 Miss. 125, 67 So. 902; State v. Bell (1904), 136 N. C. 674, 49 S. E. 163.
32 Donahue v. Russel (1933), 264 Mich. 217, 249 N. W. 830; Bagby v. Martin
(1926), 118 Okla. 244, 247 Pac. 404; Scown v. Czarneski (1914), 264 Ill. 305, 106
N. E. 276; Wilkins v. Wallace (1926), 192 N. C. 156, 134 S. E. 401; (1934) 21 Va.
L. Rev. 235.
33 For a complete discussion of the effect of such a decision, see Field, (1926)
Effect of Unconstitutional Statutes, 1 Ind. L. J. 1.
34 (1935), 193 N. E. 865 ((Ind.).
35 (1935), 193 N. E. 865 (Ind.).
36 (1935), 193 N. E. 865 (Ind.).
37 (1901), 156 Ind. 104, 59 N. E. 359, 51 L R. A. 722.
38 (1913), 179 Ind. 292, 100 N. E. 833.
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but those cases can be considered as precedent for that proposition only.
The amendment which was the subject of the litigation in State vs. Swift 39
was re-submitted at a special election in 1881, and was ratified by an affirma-
tive vote smaller than the negative vote had been at the general election the
year before.40
When the validity of a constitutional amendment is to be considered,
Section 2 of Article 16 is not to be overlooked. This section provides: "If
two or more amendments shall be submitted at the same time, they shall be
submitted in such manner that the electors shall vote for or against each of
said amendments separately; and while an amendment or amendments which
shall have been agreed upon by one General Assembly shall be awaiting the
action of a succeeding General Assembly, or of the electors, no additional
amendment or amendments shall be proposed." Whether this section means
that no amendment or amendments to the Constitution shall be submitted
while another amendment or amendments are pending, or that no amendment
shall be submitted while another amendment to the same section is pending,
has not been settled by the Supreme Court. The question is not presented by
the Todd case, however, as the lawyer amendment, as were the other four
amendments, was submitted when no amendment or amendments at all were
pending, either in the General Assembly or for vote by the electors.
CARL L. CHATTIN.
RECENT CASE NOTES
Constitutional Law--Constitutionality of the Hit-and-Run Drivers' Act.
The defendant, while driving an automobile in Indianapolis, struck and hit
one John Batkin, who died from the injuries received. Defendant was then
indicted on the ground that he unlawfully and feloniously failed to stop his
automobile and render and offer assistance to Batkin; that he failed to report
the accident to any police officer, peace officer, or police station, and he failed
to give his name, address, and license number of his car. The indictment was
in harmony with the Hit-and-Run Drivers' Act, which in substance requires
a person to stop immediately after the accident and give his name, address,
and license number to the person injured or to the police. The defendant
filed a motion to quash the indictment, which was overruled. He was tried
and found guilty, sentenced to imprisonment for one year, and fined one
hundred dollars. He thereupon appealed to the Supreme Court. Some of
his contentions were that the act is in conflict with Section 14, Article 1, of
the Indiana Constitution, which guarantees immunity from double jeopardy
and self-crimination; that it violates the Thirteenth Amendment of the Fed-
eral Constitution as authorizing involuntary servitude; and also that the act
is unconstitutional for the reason that it requires his services without just
compensation. Held, the act did not contravene the defendant's constitutional
rights.'
The old common-law maxim, nemo tenetur seipsum prodere, that no man
is bound to accuse himself of any crime, is founded in great principles of
constitutional right and was not only settled in early times in England but
was brought by our ancestors to America as part of their birthright.2 The
Constitution of the United States, as well as those of practically all of the
39 (1880), 69 Ind. 505.
40 Kettleborough, Constitution Making in Indiana, Vol. II, pp. 620-629.
I Ule v. State (1935), 194 N. E. 140 (Inc.).
2 Marshall v. Riley (1849), 7 Ga. 367.
